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Abstract
The European Union is a grand project in supranational governance. As the Union
continues to enlarge, however, it faces new challenges and new questions. In this thesis,
I use Slovakia as a case study to examine the impact of EU integration and the
relationship between the EU’s political goals and the political culture of states
themselves. I will argue that there is often a complex and contradictory relationship
between these two conceptions, and that this has long-term implications for the processes
of continued European integration, supranational governance, and Europeanization which
are central to the future of the European Union.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The European Union is the greatest project in supranationality the world has ever
known. Begun narrowly as an economic union, and originally based on the unification of
policy regarding only two products, it has developed into a major political, cultural, and
economic union. From 6 members, it has grown this year to 27, including 10 which
previously lay behind the iron curtain in the Soviet sphere of interest. When French
foreign minister Robert Schuman announced the creation of the European Coal and
Steele Community in 19501, he could not have envisioned the Union which would
eventually develop. This Union is something much more than Schuman imagined. It is a
different union with different goals, different agendas, and a diversity which would have
seemed unimaginable at its inception.
These changes have been controversial, and they have not come easily either for
the European Union or for the new member states. Greater influence has meant greater
complexity and larger bureaucracy. As states struggle to adapt to the complex rules and
regulations of the Union, the Union struggles to adapt to the new complexities that come
with diversity. The EU faces new questions with each new member. How should
economic policy be conceptualized in a union whose members’ economies run the gamut
from weak and developing, to some of the strongest in the world? Are existing policies,
formulated in the context of Western Europe, useful in a political climate still reeling
from the effects of communist oppression?

How far should expansion extend, and
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where are the lines of Europe? The answers to these questions, and the impact of
European integration will likely not be clear for some time.
In this paper, I will look at Slovakia, one of the newer members of the European
Union, to examine the impact of EU integration and the relationship between the EU’s
political goals and the political climate of states themselves. In particular, given the
European Union’s concept of the political future of Europe, I will ask how well Slovakia
conforms to this core political vision.
Slovakia’s case is especially interesting for several reasons. As a new member
state, it provides a lens through which to view the process of accession and the early
impacts of membership on new member states. The Slovak case is also particularly
interesting because Slovakia’s accession to the EU, for a time, was far from certain.
Finally, political developments in Slovakia since accession have brought to power a
government made up of three parties whose commitment to integration is dubious, and
their actions since election have further called into question their political orientation.
These events provide a particularly salient example of the complex relationship between
EU and domestic politics in member states.
I will begin my thesis by outlining a brief history of Slovakia since the 18th
century. Paying particular attention to the development of national consciousness
throughout this period and the interactions of nationalism with the outside forces which
controlled the Slovak lands, I will explore the development of Slovak political culture
through history. Slovakia’s present political climate and its relationship to the European
Union as an outside force which influences Slovak policy are integrally linked to its
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historical relationship to control by outside forces and the development of Slovak
national identity in opposition to this.
Thus grounded in the history of Slovakia, I proceed to an examination of the EU’s
development from an economic union designed to prevent war, into a supranational
organization dedicated to the unification and security of the European continent.
Beginning with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, I will explore
the way that the EU’s goals and powers have shifted over time. Through this exploration,
I will develop a paradigm for understanding the goals of the European union and outline
the core political vision which underlies these goals.
Once I have established a definition of the European Union’s political vision, I
begin to examine where Slovakia, as a new member state, fits into this political vision.
This discussion must start with a look at the accession process as the EU’s instrument of
evaluation for prospective member states. Looking at Slovakia’s movement through this
process will provide a basis for understanding Slovak integration into the EU. The
weaknesses of accession will be discussed, as well as the political values embodied by it.
Slovakia’s accession process will be the foundation upon which further examination of
the relationship between Slovak and EU political climates will be grounded.
Next I will seek to explore Slovakia’s own political culture. Here I will define
political culture as the values, beliefs, and behaviors of the citizens of a state. In
analyzing Slovakia’s fit with the EU’s political vision, I will look at three key indicators
of political culture. First, I will look at voter behavior, particularly the outcome of the
referendum on EU membership and the most recent, 2006, elections. I will use voter
behavior as a way to examine Slovak political choice, and the way that the electorate
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responds to party and organizational behavior. Secondly, I will analyze the behavior of
political parties and their programs. In this examination, I will look at the way that the
current government parties interact with and respond to the European Union and its
regulations. Finally, I will examine public opinion data from the last two years pertaining
to Slovak citizen’s own views on the European Union and their own government. I will
look at these as an indication of Slovak citizen’s relationship to the EU. These three
levels of analysis will allow my argument to be based not only on government behavior,
but also on the express opinions of citizens themselves.
Looking at these examples, I will argue that there are clear contradictions in
Slovak political culture, especially as relates to the EU. These contradictions point to a
complex relationship between Slovakia and the European Union. In my analysis and
conclusion I will explore this complex relationship and discuss the implications of such
interaction on future processes of European integration and Europeanization.

4

Chapter 2
Literature Review
My thesis will draw on, and contribute to, two separate scholarly literatures:
literature on theories of nationalism and literature on Europeanization. For many years,
these literatures have remained largely distinct, perhaps even exclusive of one another.
In recent years a few scholars have begun to discuss the intersections between these two
areas of research, and it is in this area that my work will most concretely contribute. In
this section, therefore, I will first seek to describe the current state of each of these
literatures, and then to discuss the points of intersection and their importance to events in
Central and Eastern Europe.
Theories of Europeanization
In discussing theories of Europeanization, it is important to first make a
distinction between the concept of Europeanization and that European Integration.
Although these terms would seem logically to refer to similar processes, they represent
two different, if intersecting, bodies of scholarship. As a broad generalization, theories of
integration focus primarily on the impact of shifting EU boundaries and changing
systems of governance on the European community as a collective whole. Theories of
Europeanization, on the other hand, focus on the impact of many of these same processes
on domestic political and social systems. Although there continues to be some
disagreement as to this specific distinction, the majority of scholarship subscribes to
some version of this distinction in terms.
In this paper, I will be working primarily with theories of Europeanization,
although it is inevitable that in any such discussion, theories of integration will be
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relevant. This intersection speaks to the main focus of my study, which is the
relationship between EU and domestic conceptions of political community in Slovakia.
In the long run, however, my primary interest in this study is the domestic situation in
Slovakia, and only secondarily and relationally the impact that that situation has on the
broader European community. Thus, here, I will try to discuss the ways in which
Europeanization is characterized in current scholarship, before outlining the definition I
use in this thesis.
Tania Borzel argues that “Europeanization is a two-way process. It entails a
‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ dimension” 2. In her description, the bottom-up dimension
of Europeanization encompasses the way that European institutions are developed and
create a new set of “norms, rules and practices”3, while the top-down dimension focuses
on the “impact of these new institutions on political structures and processes of the
Member States”4. This is reflective of the distinction between European integration and
Europeanization which I made above. Indeed, some definitions of Europeanization
border on confusion with issues of European integration.5 Perhaps the most important
distinction here is that of development versus impact. The bottom-up dimension of
Europeanization refers to the creation of structures, and the top-down dimension refers to
the effect of these structures on domestic actors. European integration, on the other hand,
refers to the political process of creating a union of European governments.

2

Borzel, Tania (2002).
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4
ibid.
5
Jim Bullet and Andrew Gamble discuss just this confusion in their piece “Conceptualizing
Europeanization”. They talk about the importance of considering theories of “concept formation” in the
creation of our definitions of newly developed social scientific terms.
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While I agree with Borzel that these concepts represent two dimensions of one
concept (Europeanization), many studies of Europeanization not only focus on one of
these aspects, but also define Europeanization in a way which excludes the other.
Specifically, I am referring to studies which define Europeanization as simply the
domestic impact of EU integration (see Glenn 2002, Knill & Dirk, and to a somewhat
lesser degree Gwiazda for examples of this approach)6. Often these sorts of definitions
are found in work which simply assumes an understanding of the concept of
Europeanization without putting forth a working definition. In these cases, it is most
commonly left to the reader to assume that Europeanization refers simply to the domestic
aspect of integration theory.
One problem with this type of definition is that it neglects to examine any of the
processes of Europeanization which take place outside of the European Union (both in
candidate countries and in non-EU states within Europe) and also largely ignores the bidirectional nature of Europeanization as coming both from states to the collective and
from the collective to the state (this will be discussed in somewhat more detail later). In
the simplicity of this definition, many of the important aspects of Europeanization are
lost. Seen only as an extension of theories of integration, the uniqueness and complexity
of this process at both the political and social levels is not adequately accounted for.
Some other definitions recognize the double faceted nature of Europeanization
mentioned by Borzel, but choose, as she suggests, to focus on one facet or the other.
That is, they choose to approach their study either by focusing primarily on the
6
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institutions and their development (see Bevers and Trondal)7 or by focusing primarily on
their domestic impact (see Goetz and Hix, Gwiazda, Glenn, and Knill & Dirk).8 In either
case, while analysis may be simplified, it is also incomplete. Studies focusing only on
institutions tend to minimize the impact of the often significant changes which must be
made to domestic political systems in order to implement these institutions. On the other
hand, studies which focus exclusively on domestic impact of these institutions often
minimalize the agency of domestic governments in creating and shaping political
communities and structures. In either case, important levels of analysis are neglected.
The final type of analysis of Europeanization is one which tries to bring together
both aspects of Europeanization in a working definition. This characterizes Borzel’s
approach, and similarly Howell’s (who seems to draw quite heavily on Borzel). Borzel
links the top-down and bottom-up facets of Europeanization by focusing “on the ways in
which Member State governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to
them”9. The central point of her argument is that governments, in an attempt to minimize
the costs of implementation of European norms to domestic systems, attempt to “upload
their domestic policies to the European level” while simultaneously downloading
European level standards, creating an interactive, relational process of Europeanization.10
Although Borzel does attempt to provide a more comprehensive, connective
definition of Europeanization and to analyze the process from a more holistic perspective,
there are still several major criticisms to be made of her work. Perhaps the most
7
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European integration.
9
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important is that her paper focuses on the Europeanization process almost exclusively
within member states. Disregarding for the moment the fact that Europeanization is in
some ways a global and not only a European phenomenon, the boundaries of Europe are
by no means conclusively agreed upon, nor are they delineated by the boundaries of the
European Union. Switzerland, for example, which has opted not to join the European
Union, would, I believe, be considered almost unarguably to be located within the
boundaries of Europe, and this is not to mention the numerous states which may one day
join the EU, but have not yet entered formal accession talks.11 With the boundaries of
Europe so disputed, it seems problematic to speak of Europeanization as a process only
applicable to EU member states (and perhaps also, by implication, accession states).
Even if it is EU norms which we will use to delineate “European” standards, rules,
expectations, etc, there are certainly both indirect and direct pressures on non-EU states
within the European sphere to conform to these standards, and rewards besides EU
membership (such as improved trade relations, looser border controls, etc) to be gained
through compliance to a European norm.
This however brings up the second, and perhaps more serious, criticism of Borzel,
and indeed of every theory examined thus far, and that is the exclusive focus on political
systems to the exclusion of cultural impacts or impacts on political community of
processes of Europeanization. As Europeanization theory has focused almost exclusively
on the Europeanization of institutions, it has paid little or no attention to the integration of
these institutions into society, or their acceptance by citizens of member states.
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I am thinking here principally of the Ukraine, Belarus, and some of the former
Yugoslav Republics, but Turkey may certainly also fall into this category.
9

Radaelli has previously, and I believe correctly, pointed out that Europeanization,
though commonly mistaken with such terms, is not synonymous (nor does it necessarily
imply as a consequence) convergence of ideas or policies, harmonization (that is bringing
policies into complete harmony with one another), or political integration12. I do believe,
however, that Europeanization can be conceptualized as a process of gradual gravitation
towards a core set of concepts, and a core “European” political and social identity. While
states are each moving in different ways, at different paces, and from different directions,
they are all moving, or perceive themselves to be moving, towards the same central
object. Here it is important to note that this is evidenced not only by shifts in policy or
institutional structures, but also by overall shifts in social conceptions of identity and
changes in the functioning of political communities. Additionally, I believe that the
object, “Europe”, refers to something significantly more complex than simply a
convergence of “EU standards” or policy, and instead implies a much more abstract and
intangible idea”. Indeed I perceive one of the greatest challenges in the European Union
today to be grounded in precisely the intangibility of Europe as an object. European
states all seem to believe they are heading towards the same goal (European unity), but as
evidenced by the uneven support for the EU constitution and ongoing debates about the
nature of European governance and the future of expansion, seem to perceive the nature
and shape of that goal somewhat differently.
How, then, can we define Europeanization? I submit that Europeanization refers
to the process by which a society gradually changes and gravitates in the direction of
what it perceives to be the European ideal. This is a process both of policy shifts, and

12
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changes at the cultural level, and is driven by EU standards, perceived (though not
concretely outlined) external pressures, and changes from within based on the perception
of the Europe towards which society is heading. It is an interactive process involving
both top-down and bottom-up changes13, and can be motivated by a variety of agendas.
The connecting factor in all cases is a sense of movement towards “Europe”. Although
definitions of what is represented by, how best to arrive at, and what it will take to reach
this object may differ, Europeanization represents the perceived movement towards it.
Additionally, gravitation is a multi-directional process in which all bodies exert force on
one another in order to create a functioning system of movement. The same is true of
Europeanization. Just as member states gravitate towards “Europe”, Europe is also being
shifted and steered by the member states, creating a complex system of push and pull that
shapes understandings of Europe and the European Union.

Theories of Nationalism
The second major body of literature which will inform (and be informed) by this
thesis is that on the nature of nationalism. Scholarship on theories of nationalism has
historically been divided into two general categories, within which there exist many
facets. In this paper I will refer to these two theories as the modernist and pre-modernist
theories, though each has been characterized in a variety of ways.
Pre-modernist theories of nationalism, sometimes referred to as primordialist,
essentialist, or society-centered theories, refer at the most basic level to theories which
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place the development of national consciousness before the advent of modernity (marked
as beginning in the late 18th century with the French revolution). In fact, these theories
encompass a wide variety of ideas from Pierre Van den Berghe’s14 sociobiological
approach which argues that ethnicity (and by implication nationality) is essentially
inborn, to less deterministic conceptions of the nation, such as that put forward by Liah
Greenfield15 who believes based on her historical research that ideas of nationhood
developed before modernity (especially in England). Indeed, Greenfield believes that the
nation helped usher in the age of modernity and not vice versa (as argued by modernist
theories). Although encompassing a range of theories, pre-modernist theories are
commonly grounded in an assumption:
that group identity is a given. That there exist in all societies certain primordial,
irrational attachments based on blood, race, language, religion, region, etc. [that]
Modern states…are superimposed on the primordial realities which are the ethnic
groups of communities. Primordialists believe that ethnic identity is deeply
rooted in the historical experience of human beings to the point of being
practically a given. Sociobiologists [as discussed above with Van den Bergh]
take this perspective a step further and assert the biological character of
ethnicity.16
In contrast, modernist theories of nationalism, which are sometimes referred to as
constructivist, instrumentalist or elite centered theories,
maintain that nationalism emerges as a result of the process of transition from
traditional to modern society; some of these theories focus more specifically on
the spread of industrialization, and on the socio-economic, political and cultural
conditions functionally associated with it, as the main cause for the development
of nationalism.17

14

Van den Berghe 1978
Liah Greenfield, "Is Nation Unavoidable? Is Nation Unavoidable Today?" In Hanspeter Kriesi et al.,
Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective. Chur: Rügger (1999), 37-54.
16
Llobera, Josep R. 1999. pg. 3
17
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These theories are put forth in varying ways by Gellner, Breuilly, and Mann.
Instead of being grounded in an almost atavistic understanding of the origins of national
attachment, nationalism is viewed primarily as a political construct of elites with no (or
little) grounding in a reality of cultural history. Ernst Gellner’s definition is typical of a
modernist understanding of nationalism. Gellner argues that,
nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic
boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic
boundaries within a given state—a contingency already formally excluded by the
principle in its general formulation—should not separate the power-holders from
the rest.18
A final, and relatively emergent, theory of nationalism is the ethno-symbolist
theory characterized by the scholarship of Anthony Smith. Smith’s work critiques both
modernist and pre-modernist understandings of nationalism, and as his critiques are
representative of the most common critiques leveled against these theories of nationalism,
I will outline them here, before going on to discuss the middle ground he tries to forge
between the two approaches.
In critiquing what I have here called the pre-modernist theories of nationalism
(though as noted earlier this theory goes by many names), Smith outlines three primary
critiques. First, he points out that humans have multiple identities and that therefore
ethnic or national identity has “no absolute priority”19. This begins to break down
aspects of the pre-modern model as it eliminates the primacy of national bonds and points
to a failure to explain why they, and not other group identities, take primacy in
nationalism. Secondly, he argues that ethnic or national identities are not static, but fluid
and change over time. This challenges the notion of longevity and constancy put forth in
18
19

Gellner, Ernst. 1983. pg. 1
Smith, Anthony. 1989. pg. 33
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the pre-modernist models of nationalism. If identities change over time, they cannot be
grounded in only one, static connection to history. Changing identities suggest changing
influences, and changing concepts of self and connection to the past. Finally, he calls
attention to the role of individual agency in assigning ones own ethnic identity. This
seems to challenge a sense of nations as inborn, as people are able to shift groups, in
many cases with little difficulty.
Smith also, and perhaps even more strongly, critiques the more widely accepted
modernist views of the nation. Here he points out that while the historical concept is a
relatively modern development,
it is…possible to trace the growth of national sentiments which transcend ethnic
ties back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, if not earlier, in several states of
Western Europe.20
He concedes some aspects of the modernist critique of pre-modernist theory, but points
out that modernist theories have taken the anti-historical perspective to an extreme which
is contradicted by the historical record. Secondly, Smith argues that nation building as an
active process is difficult and not always successful. The development of a strong state
does not necessarily bring about a strong national consciousness. This addresses the
modernist perspective that nationalism and the nation are a necessary outgrowth of the
development of the modern state. Additionally, it points out that identity is somewhat
more difficult to manipulate than some modernist theorists seem to suggest. Finally, he
argues that these theories fail to explain why people will irrationally continue to stand up
for the nation; why people die for nations. In other words, where does the passion come
from if national identity it purely a creation of elites? This sort of passion, seemingly
20

ibid. pg. 38
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irrational, must be more deeply grounded than to simply lie in a manipulated mind. It
seems that this passion must be connected to a deep sense of attachment to a culture and a
history that is real, or at least seems very real to the individual. By attempting to move
away from deterministic theories of ethnicity and the nation, modernists have neglected
the very real historical factors and sentiments which play into nationalism.21
In attempting to move beyond these two definitions, Smith tries to create a
definition which while recognizing the impact of modernity in helping to shape concepts
and awareness as well as expressions of nationalism and the nation, also takes into
account historical rootedness and ties within nationalism. For Smith,
Modern nations and nationalism are grounded in pre-existing ethnic ties and their
political mobilizations, and are formed by this legacy.22
In developing his “ethno-symbolist” theory of nationalism, Smith is in essence attempting
to bridge a gap between what have been two highly contentious basic approaches to the
study of nationalism. I believe that in this he is successful, and it is in his approach that I
will attempt to ground my understandings of nationalisms as they develop.
Before outlining the definition with which I will work in this paper, I would like
briefly to comment on one other common fallacy in the study of nationalism, and that is
the inherent negativity of the concept of nationalism. Often, nationalism is approached
by scholars, only in terms of its negative impact and consequences and it is assumed that
the concept itself bears an inherently negative connotation. In this case, I will attempt to
overcome this. It is important to recognize that many sentiments and movements falling
within the categories of “nationalist” can be productive, positive, and even integrative.
While much of my study will focus on the negative impacts of nationalism and the
21
22
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negative forms that it takes, it is important to note that the term and concept itself are not
normatively negative.
In this paper then, I will approach nationalism as a feeling of strong, often
passionate identification with and attachment to a self and group defined idea of the
nation brought about by both political influences, community and state structures, and a
consciousness and development of a perceived deep historical connectivity of the group,
often grounded in cultural factors such as land, language, and religion. The development
of nationalist sentiments is not only a process which is informed by elites who construct
systems which encourage national identities, but also from organic formations of identity
and consciousness of self and the group.
This definition draws significantly from Smith’s understanding of nationalism.
Additionally, instead of viewing nationalism as a purely destructive force, I will try to
examine it as simply a deep attachment to the nation, and to look at it in the context of its
influence on political culture. I hope that this definition will serve to emphasize the
multiple influences which help to create and encourage nationalism as well as the multidirectional development which I perceive nationalism as taking.

16

Chapter 3
A Brief Historical Outline of Slovakia
Almost as far back as we can trace Slovak history, it is a history of domination.
The connecting line between individual moments in the history is one of continuous
control by other groups. 23 Many “important moments”, the points on the timeline of
Slovakia, are really only the moments when the dominating group changed. A discussion
of this tendency can be traced back to the Great Moravian empire, but for the purposes of
this thesis, I will begin by looking at the period when Slovak national consciousness
began to develop, and examine the relationship of this development, and the development
of nationalism, to Slovakia’s interactions with the outside forces which controlled it.
The land that now makes up modern day Slovakia was part of the Kingdom of
Hungary beginning in about 1000 AD, although full incorporation was not achieved until
the early 1300s. It was not until the 18th century, however, that a strong movement of
Slovak national consciousness began to develop. Following the developments
throughout Europe at that time (spurred on by the French Revolution), the early years of
this movement were committed to developing a concept of national identity among
Slovaks, within the Hungarian Kingdom. One result of this movement was the
codification of Slovak as a literary language (as had been done with Czech some time
before), by Anton Bernolak in the late 18th century. This language was then reformed
and improved in the 19th century by Ludovit’ Stur. The codification of the language was
one of the first major national projects of the Slovak people. It allowed for the
development of newspapers and other publications in Slovak, which contributed to the

23

This section is drawn from a consolidation of accounts of Slovak history from Peter Toma and Dusan
Kovac’s book Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda and from the Slovak Embassy’s own account.
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continued strengthening of Slovak national identity, and was one major factors in the
development of Slovak nationalism.
One of the early manifestations of Slovak nationalism, was the struggle for
autonomy during the wars between Austria and Hungary in the mid 19th century. At this
point, the national movement was still controlled by a small group of elites. While many
Slovaks fought for the Austrians in this war in hopes of obtaining greater autonomy, most
peasants were uninvolved in the war, and some even fought for the Hungarians. The
elites hoped, however, that siding with the Austrians would lead to greater autonomy.
Unfortunately, the result was not what they had wished for. Instead of gaining greater
autonomy, they became incorporated into the Hungarian area of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire after the end of the war. This shift in leadership had little tangible impact on
Slovakia, as they remained minorities under Hungarian rule, and at this time Hungary had
significant autonomy within the empire.
In the end of the 19h century, the Slovaks formed an alliance with the Czechs and
began to talk more seriously and publicly about their desire for independence. In the late
1890s, some Slovaks took part in a conference in Budapest called the Congress of
Oppressed Peoples, which was one of the most public signs of minority resistance to have
occurred in Hungary up to this point. This was worrying to the Hungarian government,
and marked the strengthening of demands for universal voting rights and independence.
As the monarchy at this time inched slowly towards a more democratic system (although
few citizens actually had the right to vote), national movements within Austro-Hungary
began to strengthen, including among the Slovaks. This is the period during which the
first strong, Slovak political parties came into being, including Slovenska Narodna Strana
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(SNS) or the Slovak National Party, to which the modern SNS (part of the current
governing coalition) traces its roots. At the time, however, it was a party who placed
much of its faith in Russian power and the unity of the Slavs in bringing about Slovak
independence. Opposed to this conception were the Roman Catholics, represented by the
Slovak People’s Party which believed that Slovakia should focus on small steps, and
improvements gradually in the direction of stronger national character. Finally, under the
Social Democratic Party (founded in 1905), the intelligentsia, especially represented by
the youth, and taking cues from the Slovak language journal “Hlas”, supported the
actions of the Catholics, but focused on Czecho-Slovak cooperation as a path towards
greater autonomy and independence for the Slovak nation. They also tended to represent
the interests of protestants, and so the divide between this group and the Catholics was
partially grounded in religious and not only ideological differences.
The early years of the 20th century leading up to WWI were challenging times for
Slovaks, but also marked some of the earliest successes of the national movement.
During this period, the Slovaks managed to have 7 deputies elected to the Hungarian
parliament, and this strengthened the sense of national character among Slovaks. The
Hungarian government’s response, however, was oppressive and even violent. It was
during this period that Magyarization (movements by the Hungarian government to try to
make all citizens more Hungarian) reached its height. All students were required to
attend school, and all instruction was conducted in Hungarian. A particularly poignant
event from this period was the killing of 15 Slovaks by Hungarian authorities during the
consecration of a church at Cernova. When the Hungarians refused to allow Andrej
Hlinka, a popular priest and Slovak political figure who helped found the Slovak People’s
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Party, to bless the church the Slovaks protested, and were violently silenced by the
Hungarian police. In response to this increased opression, Slovak nationalism began to
be strengthened as an oppositional force to Hungarian control.
During the early 20th century, a movement of Slovaks (and Czechs) abroad also
began to play a significant role in the Slovak national movements, and especially in the
struggle for independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Czecho-Slovak
National Council, headquartered in Paris, as well as organizations in the United States
were particularly important during this time. As the national movement was increasingly
suppressed throughout wartime within the Slovak territory of the Empire, Slovaks living
abroad kept the struggle alive and began to formulate plans for the creation of an
independent Czecho-Slovak republic.
In 1915, Czechs and Slovaks abroad declared the creation of a federated Czech
and Slovak state through the Cleveland Agreement. This was followed in May of 1917,
in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, when T.G. Masaryk, who would go on to be the first president
of Czechoslovakia, signed an agreement along with other Czechs and Slovaks abroad
which guaranteed a certain level of autonomy for the Slovak lands within this federated
Czecho-Slovak republic. The creation of this state with the support of allied powers,
however, did not occur until late October 1918. Its borders were later secured under the
various international peace treaties resulting from the end of the First World War.
The interwar Czechoslovak state is often held up as the only true example of
successful democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period. It is true
that, from an economic perspective, Czechoslovakia at this time was one of the most
successful states in Europe. Additionally, the state had a democratic structure which was
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far superior to other systems in the region. This, however, belies the underlying sense of
domination felt by many Slovaks.
Slovaks were at a distinct disadvantage in Czechoslovakia in many ways. Firstly,
they represented a minority, and some numbers would seem to indicate that they were not
even the largest minority (this position being held by the Germans who at this time were
still the majority in some parts of the western Czech lands). This numerical
disadvantage, however, was coupled with a much more crippling economic and industrial
disadvantage. The Czech lands had had a very different place in the world of the last few
centuries. Czech industry was already at a relatively high level of development, and
because they had been under less repression, national institutions such as schools in the
Czech language, were already present. In Slovakia, on the other hand, industrial
development had been severely hindered by their position within the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy. Slovakia remained largely agricultural and didn’t have much of the national
infrastructure present in Moravia and the Czech lands.
These disadvantages were exacerbated in the Slovak consciousness by the
growing emphasis of many individuals in the government on the development of a
Czechoslovak national consciousness. This was problematic, because Slovak national
consciousness had only recently been solidified, and threatened to be subsumed within
this larger collective understanding of the nation (which also was, consequently, the
understanding of the nation embodied in the Czechoslovak constitution). Additionally,
because most of the high-ranking government officials were Czechs and there were very
few positions, even within Slovakia, occupied by Slovaks, there was a strong de facto
emphasis on the “Czech” in Czechoslovak. All of these philosophical issues of identity
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and nation coupled with the already growing resentment among Slovaks of their position
of social disadvantage, and their broad exclusion from powerful government position,
sparked the beginning of the Slovak autonomy movement in the interwar period.
This movement was beginning to grow, but had not yet been addressed by the
government, when Hitler began threatening the lands to Germany’s east. Under
increasing pressure from Hitler, in the fall of 1938 Czecho-Slovakia was forced to cede
large parts of its territory to both the West and the South to Germany and Hungary
respectively. Later during that same fall, the Czecho-Slovak government, now strongly
influenced by Nazi control, granted autonomy to Slovakia. The following spring,
Slovakia achieved full independence after which the government quickly devolved into a
one party system led by general Jozef Tiso. This independent Slovak state would be
strongly influenced by the Nazi regime in Germany, and by fascist ideology.
Under the fascist government of the independent Slovak Republic, genocide was
committed against the Jews on a mass scale. Very few of Slovakia’s Jews came out of
World War II alive. In terms of actual battle, however, Slovakia’s participation in the
war was relatively minimal in comparison to other countries. In fact, conditions during
the war were reasonably good, as war created jobs and some economic opportunities.
Nonetheless, there was a fairly large resistance movement which began from the very
beginning of the fascist control of the state. Many Slovaks joined the Soviet army, and
became members of Czecho-Slovak divisions of that army. Indeed, according to the
Slovak embassy’s rendition of history, by the end of the war more Slovaks were fighting
for the Allied forces than for the Germans who officially controlled the state, though
these numbers may not be entirely accurate.
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Late in the war, the Slovak National Council formed and began, along with the
Czecho-Slovak government in exile in London, to plan a national uprising. This uprising,
which took place in 1944, eventually was defeated by Germany. For a few months,
however, Slovak rebels held large sections of central Slovakia and ruled as an unofficial
government, also creating new political parties and operating a rebel radio station. This
also helped to cement some ideas of Slovak national consciousness, as it was one of the
first times that Slovakia had acted in its own interest with little assistance from the
outside world. Slovak national identity was thus cemented in two powerful, but
conflicting ways: through the support of the independent state and through the resistance
movement. In this way, Slovak national identity was both strengthened and polarized.
Following the end of the Second World War, negotiations began in relation to the
formation of the post-war state. Because Czechoslovakia had been liberated by the
Soviets, and also because of persistent pan-Slavic understandings of international
relations among many in both the Czech lands and Slovakia, these negotiations were
strongly influenced by the Soviets. In fact, the initial meetings which determined the
structure of the new state were held in Moscow. During many of these negotiations,
Slovak delegates were largely excluded. In the initial negotiations, Slovaks were only
included in discussions regarding Czech and Slovak relations in the new state. The
outcome of the meetings in Moscow and the subsequent meeting between Czech and
Slovak groups in Kosice was an agreement to a generally democratic governmental
structure in which Slovaks would be granted considerable autonomy, and which
recognized the Czechs and Slovaks as separate, equal nations. This would never actually
be a fully realized policy, as politics tended to remain dominated from Prague.
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In the first free elections, held in 1946, the majority of Slovaks voted for the
Democratic Party. Because, however, the majority of Czechs voted for the Communist
Party, and Czechs held the majority in the country, the Communist Party received a total
of 38% of the voted in the entire country, giving it a majority. Eventually, in 1948, the
communist party seized complete control of Czechoslovakia.
Communist Czechoslovakia would be the next dominating force in the history of
Slovakia. Having been minorities, and often persecuted minorities, within the Kingdom
of Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian empire, the first Czecho-Slovak state (despite
promises to the contrary), and having lacked full control over their own country during
the fascist years of the first independent Slovak Republic, Slovaks hoped that under
communism they would at least have the greater autonomy promised to them under the
Moscow and Kosice agreements. To some extent, this would be a reality. Especially
later during the communist years, Slovakia did, in fact, gain greater autonomy from other
states than it had probably ever possessed. Many Slovaks did participate in the
Czechoslovak government during the communist years. One of the most famous attempts
at liberalization in communist history, the concept of socialism with a human face during
the Prague Spring, was conceptualized and led by Alexandr Dubcek, a Slovak. However,
with the exception of this brief period the country remained under strict communist rule,
controlled to a large degree from Moscow, and it is hard to argue that the country had any
real autonomy.
Nonetheless, Slovakia was given a certain level of control over its own affairs,
within the structure of the communist party system, especially after the Soviets put down
the liberalization of the Prague Spring and federalized the Czechoslovak state. Decisions
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were no longer solely, or even primarily, controlled from Prague. This greater level of
autonomy may help to explain why the resistance movement to communism was much
less outspoken in Slovakia, than in the Czech Republic.
In the Czech lands, underground resistance movements among intellectuals grew
up quite strongly relatively early in the communist period. Slovakia’s resistance
movement had a much different, and much quieter face. Grounded in the work of some
Catholic priests, Slovakia’s resistance was primarily a religious one (though Slovak
intellectual dissidents did participate with Czech dissidents in Prague), and much of the
most outspoken actions of political dissent by Slovaks took place in the Czech lands and
not in Slovakia. As such, Slovakia never fully developed the large, underground
intellectual network that developed in the Czech Republic.
When resistance began to rise in the late 1980s, and under Gorbachev the Soviet
Union began to gradually loosen its strangle hold on the independent states of Eastern
and Central Europe, most of the activity was happening in Prague. Although some of the
250 people who had signed the Charter 77 declaration in 1977 demanding improved
human rights standards were Slovaks, the majority were Czechs, as well as most high
ranking members of the resistance movement. This lack of a strong dissident movement
meant that Slovaks did not develop the same underground intellectual class as the
Czechs. When the communist system was finally dissolved, it was the Czechs who took
the greatest control of the country, because it was largely the Czechs who had the
capacity to do so.
From the very beginning of the newly independent Czechoslovak state, there were
problems negotiating the role that Slovaks would play in the government. An inability to
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agree on these issues was one of the primary motivating factors for the division of the
single state into two in 1992. This marked the first time in Slovak history where it would
be a truly independent state. Even during its brief period of independence, its sovereignty
was limited by German oversight. It is in this context that was can begin to look at the
relationship between Slovakia and the European Union.
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Chapter 4
EU History and the Development of a European Political Vision
Before examining the interaction between Slovak and EU political visions, it is
important to define what the EU’s political vision is. In this chapter, I will outline the
history and development of the European Union. Beginning with the early creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community, and following the development of this initial
organization through to the European Union as it exists today, I will look at the process
through which the EU has shaped its vision of the European political world. Finally, I
will outline the characteristics which define the EU’s political vision and its goals for the
future of Europe.
The early history of the European Union lies in the aftermath of the Second World
War and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This
idea, as first announced by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in mid-1950,
dictated that French and German coal and steel would be pooled together and governed
by a common “High Authority”24. Although the union between these countries was to be
an economic one, the theory underlying its creation was based on the idea of creating
greater European security and stability. As such, it was integrally linked with concepts of
nationalism.
Having just come out of a major nationalist conflict, France and Germany
recognized a need for change. Past attempts by individual nations to take control of the
European continent, driven by nationalist rhetoric, had led to two major European wars in
less than half a century. Although not using the word “nationalism” these states
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addressed their fear of its resurgence and/or continuation in the preamble to the founding
treaty. After asserting the centrality of peace to the project, the preamble goes on to say
that the states signing it are:
Resolved to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests;
to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and
deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the
foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward
shared.25
The “age old rivalries” of Europeans had been national, and the preamble suggested the
elimination of divisions on this basis in favor of a unification of European interests. They
advocated the creation of a community whose future would be a shared one, not hindered
by national particularity, but strengthened by each of its members.
Economics was a reasonable place to start. By sacrificing a level of national
sovereignty to the sovereignty of a collective authority, states were binding themselves to
one another in a web of interconnectedness. As Schuman declared when he announced
the creation of the community, this interdependence of resources would make “any war
between France and Germany…not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”26.
Economic unification would bring positive results for all states, while allowing them to
retain their sovereignty in most issues. In the end not only France and Germany, but also
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty in Paris in 1951, establishing “the ECSC High Authority, to which
member governments transferred their sovereign powers.”27. This organization laid the
foundation for the development, over the next half century of an increasingly large and
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increasingly interdependent union of states, which eventually developed into the
European Union.
While economic union, especially in the early years was relatively successful and
fairly widely embraced in the 6 member countries of the ECSC, early attempts to move
from a purely economic union and consolidate military and political programs were
unsuccessful. In 1957 the ECSC members, as a part of the Treaty of Rome, created the
European Economic Community (EEC) which consolidated their markets and economic
policies beyond simply coal and steel, and further established the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM), which consolidated policies on nuclear power. These
first decades of European community, however, were primarily focused on solidifying
and strengthening the economic union created by the ECSC and creating the institutions
to support it. It was not until the late 1980s, however, that a unified Europe as we know
it today would begin to solidify.28
In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was passed. This marked the first major
successful attempt by the European Community to progress from simple economic union
and towards increasing political and cultural union. This act increased the powers of the
European Community so that they included issues such as the creation of common
foreign and environmental policy. It also created institutional changes which made it
easier to make decisions at a European level. Finally, it strengthened many of the
economic ideas which had been laid out in the treaty of Rome. Consolidation of policies
under this treaty, however, was not entirely successful. Instead, it laid the foundation for
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the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union, 6 years later which
would officially create the “European Union”.29
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, represented an even clearer shift than the
SEA in the goals of the European Community. It embodied a commitment to much
broader unification of policies across the community. It was this treaty that opened the
way for political, and eventually cultural, unification which has dramatically changed the
shape of European unification since. According to the European Union, the treaty
“responded to 5 key goals”:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the institutions
Improving the effectiveness of the institutions
Establishing economic and monetary union
Developing the Community social dimension
Establishing a common foreign and security policy30

In responding to these goals, the treaty created the European Union, which it founded
upon three pillars.
The first pillar was “the European Communities”31. This pillar encompassed all
of the policy established by the ECSC, EURATOM, as well as the economic and
monetary union as laid out by earlier treaties, and expanded within the Maastricht treaty.
This pillar also included an expansion of cooperation in policies related to research,
education and the environment. In general, it covers areas of policy where “Member
States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions”32.
The second pillar called for the implementation of Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), which was suggested by earlier treaties, but whose creation was only
29
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clearly called for under the Maastricht Treaty. The recommendations laid out by
Maastricht are meant to replace earlier recommendations in previous treaties. It did not,
however, fully unify foreign policies across the union. Instead, it allowed and suggested
that states take action together, but was based not on EU enforcement, but on
intergovernmental cooperation and consensus. The third pillar of the European Union is
the unification of “justice and home affairs”33, and called for intergovernmental
cooperation in these areas.
Although Maastricht did not create a federal European state, as some had thought
was the direction of the European Union, it did reform the core ideals of the organization.
Having begun with the goal of preventing nationalist conflict and creating a more secure,
successful Europe, the European Union was now a fully political and, in many ways,
cultural union, at least on paper. It created European citizenship, making all citizens of
member states citizens of the Union as well. Citizenship was a codification of the EU’s
goal of creating a supranational identity which would supercede or at least work in
concert with national identity. The European Union was no longer a purely economic
union, but a union which encompassed many aspects of politics, culture, and daily life for
people in member states.
Since Maastricht, the European Union has reformed its functions through both the
Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. It has remained committed, however, to the
expanded unification of the European community as laid out in Maastricht, and has
sought, throughout the 1990s and early 21st century the creation of even greater
convergence of policy.
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The final, and perhaps clearest evidence of the EU’s push for increased
supranationality, is the failed treaty on the European Constitution34. The creation of an
EU constitution in the form suggested would have marked another major milestone in
European history. Many states felt, however, that the constitution represented
federalization to too great a degree, and their citizens were unwilling to support it in the
end. Some also felt that it was too great a sacrifice of national sovereignty. The fact that
it was opposed in referendum by both French and Dutch voters is an especially strong
sign that Europe is not ready for such a move, as these states have traditionally been two
of the strongest supporters of the European Union.35
The European Union has come a long way from its first conception as a steel and
coal sharing treaty between France and Germany. From the original six members it has
grown, this year, to 27. Its members now include states who were under communist
control when the Union was founded, and whose histories suggest that their integration
into the Union will be a particularly interesting process. The European Union is now a
large, supranational organization whose reach extends into issues of politics, agriculture,
security, and even culture. Its core political project is one of supranationality; the
creation of a group of states whose citizens see themselves as integrally linked to the
larger collective of members. Its aim is the creation of a European identity, “united in
diversity”, and the unification of the policies of those states which are part of the
European community.
Looking at the EU’s development, and drawing heavily on the Treaty of
Maastricht, and on the European Union’s own literature, I define the EU’s political vision
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as encompassing four major characteristics: supranationality, democracy, respect for
human and minority rights, and social responsibility. In many ways, despite all the
changes that have taken place in the Union in the past few decades, these core political
ideals are not so different from those embodied by the early incarnations of the EU.
Today, the EU views supranationality in a much broader way than it did in its early
conceptions, but supranationality was always central to a project of European
Unification. Democracy is embodied today by the EU’s attempts to create strong,
democratic states on its Eastern borders, but is also in evidence in the structure of the
early institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community. Respect for minority and
human rights has become much more central in EU discourse, but the human rights
regime developed concurrently with the development of the European community, and
there was always a link between the two. Finally, a sense of social responsibility is
central to the EU’s vision. This developed most concretely with the treaty of Maastricht,
however, it is embodied in the economic policies of early European collectives.
As I have said the EU has changed significantly throughout the years. In terms of
core values, however, much as stayed the same. EU institutions have developed to better
assert its political vision, and to spread that vision throughout Europe. In the next
sections I will examine how successful this process of transmission and expansion has
been.
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Chapter 5
The Accession Process and Slovakia’s Path to Membership
In order to begin discussing how Slovakia conforms to the EU’s political vision, I
will begin with an examination of the history of interaction between Slovakia and the
European Union. This began right after the fall of communism, while Slovakia was still
a part of Czechoslovakia, and continues till the present day. Here, I will briefly outline
the EU accession process, and discuss the way this process occurred in Slovakia. The
focus here will be on creating a picture of how relationships between Slovakia and the
EU developed, and the process that Slovakia went through in trying to conform to the
EU’s political vision and gain membership to the Union.
European Union membership has been seen in Slovakia as a marker of the sort of
economic and political stability which they have worked towards since the fall of
communism, as well as representing a cultural ‘return to Europe’. Beyond the clear
monetary and political benefits perceived to come with accession, there is also a strong
sense of national pride that is at stake among ordinary people in the struggle for EU
membership. European Union membership became a symbol of Slovakia’s return to its
rightful place in the European community.
The road to EU accession is a long and arduous one for even the most stable
candidate countries. For countries like Slovakia, whose political climate has oscillated
somewhat unpredictably between promoting strong, western European style democratic
principles and more nationalist, isolationist policy, the process was even more
challenging. Although Slovakia successfully joined the European Union in 2004, in 1998
it had been originally excluded from the group of states expected to join in the next

34

accession, instead having been classified, along with Romania and Bulgaria, as a state
which had made insufficient progress towards membership to warrant serious
consideration of immediate accession. In this chapter I will outline the accession process
as a whole looking both at the process as it stands now, and how the process was different
for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) than it was for earlier accession
states. I will then proceed to a discussion of this process as it occurred in Slovakia.

The Accession Process
At the most basic level, the criteria for accession to the EU are extraordinarily
simple. As defined by the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, all states wishing to join the
European Union must meet the following three criteria:
1. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and
respect for and protection of minorities.
2. Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union.
3. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union.36
The simple wording and layout of these standards is, however, misleading.
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, for many of the CEECs creating a strong,
democratic political climate, a functioning market economy and developing the
institutional stability to allow them to fulfill obligations of EU membership is no mean
feat. The accession process, however, is complicated in ways that go beyond the obvious
challenges of shifting an entire governmental system.
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Firstly, the Copenhagen criteria as the basic expectations for membership have
been written vaguely, with no explanation of what it would mean to “achieve stability”,
“have a functioning market economy”, etc. This lack of specificity leads to considerable
confusion regarding the precise expectations which must be met in order for membership
to be granted. Given the diversity of economic styles, minority protection strategies,
governmental structures, etc. in current EU member states it is perhaps understandable
that standards for accession would be vague, allowing for a broad number of effective
solutions to institutional problems and the development of varied, case based solutions
for improvement of governmental systems, economic markets, and rights protection laws.
In reality, however, the accession process, especially as it has developed in the most
recent accessions, allows for very little of this sort of individuality.37
Despite the lack of specificity in the actual standards required for membership,
the EU seems to have developed a set of increasingly specific de facto standards for
accession states. As Heather Grabbe has pointed out,
Considering the variety of models of capitalism to be found among EU member
states, the accession policy documents (particularly the Accession Partnerships…)
promote a remarkably uniform view of what a “market economy” should look
like.38
We can see a similar trend in the promotion of minority language laws and other human
rights standards as the primary path towards minority protection, as well as in the
expanded understanding of what is needed to fulfill the “obligations of membership”.
Previously this condition was considered to require the
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implementation of the acquis communitaire which amounts to 80,000 pages of
legislative texts already, but it keeps growing as the Union develops new policies
and issues new directives, declarations, and jurisprudence.39
For the CEECs, however,
The acquis has been defined more broadly as “all the real and potential rights and
obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework.” 40
Especially given what Grabbe calls the “maximalist” interpretation of this definition by
the European Union, this means that the accession process for the CEECs is much less
flexible and case based than earlier accession procedures. In earlier accessions, the
process was much more focused on a cooperative, mutually beneficial negotiation
process allowing for concessions, opt outs, and special intergovernmental agreements.
The relationships mirrored, in many ways, a productive business relationship between
two companies.
In contrast, the relationship between the European Union and the CEECs has been
more akin to that of a strict parent to a misbehaving child, with firm consequences and
denial of privileges if rules are not followed exactly as presented. While, “Greece,
Portugal, and Spain were allowed into the Union with the aim of helping them
consolidate democracy after entry”41, the CEECs are expected to have fully complied
with all EU standards at their time of entry. Additionally, while there are very limited
possibilities for transitional periods or special arrangements for the CEECs, the European
Union has placed strong, and somewhat long-term, limitations on some of the most
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important rewards associated with joining the Union, such as access to free movement of
labor and open borders.
It is important to note this power differential within the accession process. In some
ways, it seems obvious that the European Union would hold the power in the accession
process, but within the current structure, candidate states retain almost no autonomous
power within this process. This has not always been true, and the results of the one-way
conversation that represents the current accession process can be extremely detrimental to
candidate countries.
The Accession Process in Slovakia
The problems with the accession process can be especially frustrating for a state
like Slovakia, whose path to Union membership was so fraught with difficulty. Although
Slovakia’s negotiations with the European Union initially began during the early 90s as
part of Czechoslovakia, its progress very quickly deteriorated after the Velvet Divorce
under the government of Vladimir Meciar.
By the time Slovakia became an independent state in 1993, it had, as a part of
Czechoslovakia, begun many of the initial steps towards joining the EU by beginning to
network with international and European organizations, as well as becoming party to
various conventions and establishing trade agreements. Immediately after independence,
Slovakia renegotiated a Europe Agreement as an independent state, joined the OSCE, the
Council of Europe, and the UN, as well as joining NATO's Partnership for Peace
Programme. Despite these initial positive signs, even in the early years of independence,
under the third Meciar government of 1994-1998, significant problems of implementation
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and democracy building arose which caused problems for Slovakia in creating further
movement towards EU accession.
As Geoffrey Pridham explains in his article comparing the Meciar government
with the much more pro-EU government of Mikulas Dzurinda which followed it,
Meciar’s policy, while continuous with that pursued since the end of communism,
left doubts about the priority accorded relations with the EU. Notwithstanding
formal initiatives, like making an application for EU membership early in his
third government in June 1995, the strategic commitment to follow through with
necessary measures was not strong.42
Throughout the mid-1990s, the Meciar government continually failed to fulfill the
obligations necessary for EU accession. The EU issued a series of demarches, or
“official criticisms”, mainly expressing
concern over the growing power of the executive in Slovak politics, attempts to
undermine parliamentary control and opposition parties, assaults on the
independent media and moves to discriminate against the Hungarian minority in
official matters.43
The Slovak government’s response to these criticisms was less than optimal.
These reactions ranged from partial denial or downplaying of a problem, and
assertions of procedural rectitude or misunderstanding of the Slovak position, to
denunciation of intervention in internal affairs or attacks on the opposition parties
for giving Slovakia a bad name abroad (as they tended to provide the EU with
evidence of abuses of power at home).44
In addition to the government’s general lack of positive response to the growing
concerns of the European Union and other international organizations, the Meciar
government was unable to effectively function in the Western diplomatic world. A more
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eastern orientation (Meciar was fond of discussing Slovakia as a bridge between east and
west), combined with a weak diplomatic corps which lacked both linguistic skills and
adeptness in interactions with western elites, made the formation of important bilateral
relationships with western countries very difficult.
By 1997 “there was talk about terminating the Europe Agreement with
Slovakia.”45, but this did not cause a significant change in Meciar’s policy. As a result,
Slovakia was not invited, along with the Czech Republic and some of the other CEECs,
to begin official negotiations for European Union membership. This was one of several
motivating factors which led to the formation of an alliance among various opposition
parties in Slovakia in advance of the 1998 elections. The mobilization of the opposition
in response to the authoritarian practices of the Meciar government led to a victory in
1998 by Mikulas Dzurinda, and the creation of a new, four party democratic coalition.46
Almost immediately, the newly formed coalition government instituted a
dramatically improved approach to relations with Brussels. Possessing both the political
will and the diplomatic savvy that Meciar had lacked, Dzurinda visited Brussels only
days after his election and established the European Commission/Slovakia High Level
Working Group to help recreate positive movement towards accession. This was the first
of a number of steps which began to open a better conversation between Slovakia and the
European Union. Additionally, Dzurinda very quickly improved the diplomatic corps,
strengthened international inter-party ties, and provided increased access for the
European Union to high level Slovak government officials.47
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While Slovakia’s problems with EU accession hardly disappeared with the change
in government, reports were continually and overwhelmingly positive throughout the late
1990s. Despite some challenging intra-coalition disagreements, official opinions from
EU sources as well as international organizations and the United States (who had been
one of the key players in keeping Slovakia from full NATO membership) were optimistic
about Slovakia’s path towards stable democracy. In late 1999, Slovakia entered official
negotiations for EU membership and in 2000 became a full member of NATO.48
The changes which occurred from the very beginning of the Dzurinda government
allowed Slovakia to move more or less smoothly along the path towards EU accession.
While there continued to be tensions between members of the coalition government, and
some struggles with implementation, especially regarding contentious issues like
minority language laws, the strengthened relationship between Brussels and Bratislava, as
well as the ongoing commitment of the Dzurinda government to EU accession, kept these
problems somewhat in check.49
Having been initially excluded from the group of countries expected to join the
EU in the early 21st century, Slovakia’s remarkable progress following 1998 led to the
country’s accession, along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and most of the other
North and Central Eastern European countries in 2004. This membership should have
marked the achievement, by Slovakia, of substantial convergence of policy with the
European Union and a dedication to the political goals of the European Union. The rest
of this paper will examine how well Slovakia actually conforms to the EU’s political
vision, and the relationship between this vision and Slovakia’s own political culture.
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Chapter 6
Voter Behavior and the European Union
The first level of analysis at which I which I will evaluate Slovakia’s relationship
with the European Union’s political vision is that of voter behavior. Focusing on the
referendum on EU membership in 2003 and the most recent parliamentary elections in
2006, I will explore the way that voter behavior reflects support for the European Union’s
political program. By evaluating the choices that Slovaks make, and the ways that those
choices are influenced, we can gain a better understanding of the way that citizens engage
(or choose not to) with the political world in and beyond their country.
Referendum on European Union Membership
The Slovak referendum on the European Union took place in May of 2003. This
referendum was exceptional in the history of the European Union for two key reasons.
The first, and most often commented upon, way in which this referendum stood out from
others was in the percentage of voters who voted in support of EU membership.
Although throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the EU had enjoyed relatively high
levels of support in similar referendums, the Slovak case had the highest percentage of
‘yes’ votes ever recorded in an EU referendum. Although numbers range from 93-95%,
Karen Henderson, evaluating valid votes instead of total votes, puts the percentage at
93.71% votes in favor of EU membership.50
This extraordinary level of support, interesting on its own, is even more
interesting when examined in combination with the other way that the Slovak referendum
was unique. While no other referendum produced such a high number of ‘yes’ votes, the
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Slovak referendum also had the second lowest level of voter turnout of any of the
referendums on EU membership. Only 52.15% of the population voted, and the
threshold of validity was only passed in the last hour of the referendum.51
Karen Henderson has evaluated the significance of this in great detail in her
article “EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus”. She points to a number of
factors which influenced this outcome. Firstly, she argues that what the EU referendum
was measuring was not the inherent support for the EU as an institution. By the time
referendums were held in Slovakia and other Central and Eastern European countries,
“there was no realistic alternative to EU membership for the states of Central and Eastern
Europe”. Economically and politically, it would have been disastrous not to join the
EU.52
Henderson argues, in a second article, that because Slovaks did not perceive
opposition to the EU as an appealing option, EU membership came to represent a set of
cultural and social issues which were highly salient in the Slovak consciousness, and
intricately linked with the Slovak sense of self and of the nation. Henderson argues that
Pro-EU attitudes reflect a symbolic adherence to the notion of a “return to
Europe” which assumes that the demands of EU membership are merely a
blueprint for returning countries to the positions they would have been in if they
had not been subjected to communist rule.53
She goes on to argue that opposition to the EU in Slovakia is thus related not to an
opposition to the institution as such, but to a general opposition to the project of
democratization and Europeanization. Those opposing the EU tend to be those who
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“have alternative images of what their country would have been like had it been able to
follow an indigenously determined path in the second half of the 20th century.”54 These
tend to be those who are nostalgic for either the communist of fascist periods of Slovak
history. We can also see this by looking at the makeup of the voters, where Henderson
observes that “the prominence of supporters of the unreformed Communist Party of
Slovakia among ‘no’ voters suggests that the underlying issue was regime change”55. As
such, the referendum did not truly represent an evaluation of the support for EU
membership, but was instead a vote on Slovakia’s return to Europe, and its right to be a
member of the European community in general, which was something which few Slovaks
opposed.
Because of the perception of EU membership as returning Slovakia to its rightful
place in Europe (as noted above), it also became political suicide for a party to openly
oppose to the EU. Even the previously very Euroskeptical HZDS supported the EU as
Slovakia approached referendum. This meant that leading up to the referendum there
was no open opposition to the EU, and therefore no political debate, and no concerted
effort at a ‘no’ campaign. This lack of debate combined with the a sense that EU
membership was a necessity for the future of Slovakia meant that many “voters with a
level of antipathy towards the EU, together with a lack of interest and information,
reacted by withdrawing from politics and staying home.”56
Thus the EU referendum was primarily a measure of Slovaks’ commitment to
continued transition and democratization in general as opposed to strong support for EU
institutions and the process of European integration specifically. This is not to argue that
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Slovaks did not support the EU (which will be explored more deeply in the following
chapters), but that referendum outcomes alone do not describe the true level of support
within Slovak society. It is also important to observe the overwhelming lack of debate in
the lead up to EU membership, and therefore very little information on the possible
negative impacts of EU integration.
2006 Parliamentary Elections
The 2006 elections were the first since Slovakia had joined the European Union.
In the months leading up to the elections, there was much speculation among scholars
and in the press as to who would win the election, and even more importantly who that
party would choose as its coalition partners. There were only two parties who were really
in a position to receive the most votes, according to polling data before the election: the
ruling SDKU (Democratic and Christian Union) led by Mikulas Dzurinda, and the
relatively young Smer, a socialist party, led by Robert Fico. In the end, Smer received
just under 30% percent of the votes, with the SDKU earning only a little more than
18%.57
This outcome was extremely important in terms of defining the Slovak political
orientation. The SDKU under Dzurinda’s leadership had pulled Slovakia out of
international isolation, and turned the country’s international image around. His coalition
had been almost single handedly responsible for gaining Slovakia membership in the
European Union. Nonetheless, SDKU was unable to retain its place in the government,
and was replaced by Smer.
Smer, led by Robert Fico, was a relatively young party founded in 2000. The
party had run on a platform of overturning the reforms created by the Dzurinda
57
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government, especially in terms of fiscal policy and taxation. Robert Fico, who became
prime minister after the elections, was something of an unpredictable character. In the
past, he had been compared to a younger version of Vladimir Meciar, the man who led
Slovakia into international isolation in the 1990s. He had a history of anti-minority
rhetoric towards both the Roma and Hungarian communities, and had always taken a
somewhat Euroskeptical approach to relationships with the EU. Many scholars, however,
believed that these had been mistakes of youth, and that he had moved more towards a
mainstream, pro-western political platform.58
The results of this election are intriguing, especially so soon after gaining
European Union membership. One might anticipate that Dzurinda’s SDKU, having been
largely responsible for Slovakia’s gaining membership in the European Union, would
have enjoyed a relatively high level of popularity among Slovak citizens. Given the high
levels of support for the EU which seemed to be evident in the referendum (despite the
issues associated with low turnout), it is somewhat surprising that the party to win the
most votes in the 2006 elections was one that ran on a platform of overturning some of
the very policies which had gained Slovakia entry into the EU and legitimacy in the
international community.
One possible explanation for this seemingly contradictory outcome is related to
Henderson’s explanation of the EU referendum results. Given that the EU referendum
seems to have been less a referendum on EU institutions as such, and more concretely a
referendum on Slovak return to Europe and democratization in general, the results of the
election may actually begin to illuminate the real points of Slovak support. While
Slovaks support EU membership as a concept, and as an unavoidable step in the
58
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continuation of Slovak success as a state (as demonstrated by the EU referendum), they
tend not to actually agree with many of the policies which line up most closely with the
EU’s political goals as we can see in the lack of support garnered by Dzurinda’s party in
the most recent elections. Although Dzurinda had been an attractive candidate in
previous years because his party represented the promise of successful EU accession,
once such accession was achieved, Slovaks were less willing to actively support the
actual policies which brought about this success.
In any case, the results of both of these votes demonstrate a complexity in the
behavior of the Slovak citizenry in voting, and also suggest a complicated relationship
between the values of Slovak citizens and the values of the EU. These issues will be
explored more deeply in the later analysis chapter.
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Chapter 7
Political Party Behavior and the European Union
The second level of analysis at which I will examine the relationship between
Slovak and EU political values is the behavior and programs of political parties in
Slovakia. First, I will look at Smer’s choice of coalition partners in evaluating the party’s
underlying political goals. Then, looking at behavior since the formation of the coalition,
I will analyze the way that this behavior compares to and responds to the EU’s core
political vision.
Coalition Formation
Given the distribution of votes, and the unpredictability of Fico as a political
player, the choices made in coalition formation following the 2006 elections were of
particular importance. Kevin Deegan-Kraus, in his post-election analysis, identifies eight
possible coalitions which could be formed in order to create a majority. Two of these
would have excluded Smer as a coalition partner, but would have required a significant
level of cooperation between parties which were unlikely to cooperate, and so it seemed
most likely from the beginning that Smer would form the government.59
The coalition which Smer formed, however, was one which had been referred to
in the past as the “worst-case scenario”60, and which few people predicted would be the
coalition choice. He joined forces with the ultra-nationalist SNS (Slovak National Party)
and the HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), which under the leadership of
Vladimir Meciar had driven the Slovak reputation and economy into the ground in the
1990s.
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One analyst at Transitions Online Magazine made a forceful argument in the days
after the election and before the formation of the coalition in which he argued that a
coalition between Smer, SNS and HZDS was a virtual impossibility. The commentator
argues that,
Fico would be making a bad miscalculation to team up with Meciar…By
partnering with Meciar, Fico would gain no fresh votes, could lose some, and
would almost certainly ensure he could not gain more votes come the next
elections. The same is also true (probably even truer) about any link-up with the
nationalists. Such a coalition would tell the electorate that Fico believes the way
forward leads backwards. Back to a divisive period…So, political history and
logic suggest Fico will look to the right to form a governing coalition.61
This argument looks very much like those made by many observers in the international
press in the days between the election and the formation of the coalition. A coalition
with SNS and HZDS, especially when there were other, viable coalition options
available, seemed to be a sign that Slovakia was headed back towards a more national, as
opposed to supranational model. It returned Vladimir Meciar, the HZDS leader best
known for nearly ruining Slovakia’s chances at EU membership, to a place within the
government, and relegitimized the SNS whose outspoken leader, Jan Slota, was notorious
for drunken rants about Hungarians, and for complaining about the Roma birth rate. If
Fico was trying to recreate himself and his party not as the Euroskeptics they had been in
the 90s, but as pro-European, forward thinking social democrats, a coalition with the two
Slovak parties which look the least Euro-friendly seems an odd choice.
Supranationality
The Party of European Socialists (PES), the umbrella organization for socialist
parties in the European Union, also thought that this was an unfitting choice. Only weeks
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after the formation of the coalition, they issued a suspension to Smer, charging that as
nationalism was in direct conflict with the ideals of socialism, a coalition with an extreme
nationalist party was inappropriate for a member of their organization. In June, there will
be a review of this suspension, but it marks an important sight for analyzing the
orientation of the present government.62
Since the party’s suspension from the PES, Fico and other Smer leaders have
made no attempt to negotiate with the PES to regain entry to the organization. The leader
of the PES, Martin Schultz , has expressed confusion on several occasions as to why the
party would not try to regain their place within the organization. He has said that he,
“can’t imagine why Robert Fico would be so passive”63 in his approach to Smer’s
suspension. Indeed, it seems Fico would have very little to lose by negotiating with the
PES, and significant international legitimacy to gain.
Fico’s response to suspension from the PES represents one of the ways that the
government’s behavior since forming a coalition has indicated a dubious commitment to
the principle of supranationality. In a supranational organization like the European
Union, the multi-lateral relationships formed in block groups like the PES are especially
important. During the Meciar government, antagonistic relations with diplomats from
other EU countries were one issue which led to Slovakia’s international isolation.
Additionally, membership in party groups, like the PES, are important for creating a
voice for individual state party programs within the wider context of the European
community. Fico has shown, through his lack of response to PES criticism, and his
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continued defense of the SNS as a party which is not extremist or nationalist, that he is
not overly concerned with the maintenance of these international relationships.
Additionally, in Slovak foreign policy, Fico and his party have seemed to make
moves towards asserting greater Slovak independence from European ideas. Fico was
recently criticized for attending a gala at the Cuban embassy in Bratislava in honor of the
communist revolution in that country. Domestically, this raised eyebrows as an issue of
decorum, but it also seems to be one event of several which signal a shift in Slovakia’s
foreign policy in general.64
In addition to attending the party at the Cuban embassy, Fico has also
strengthened Slovakia’s ties with a number of internationally isolated regimes like Libya
and Belarus. This general trend in improving Slovak relationships with this kind of
regime represents a show of Slovak independence in issues of policy from the European
Union. Especially when combined with the governments somewhat tense relationship
with it’s counterparts in Europe, this seems to be a troubling move away from European
concepts of a supranational vision of Europe, and towards more independent policy
making as well as closer relationships with troubling regimes.65
Finally, the rhetoric of some of the members of the coalition, especially the SNS,
has been in direct conflict with principles of supranational government in Europe. Jan
Slota has stated, in an interview with the Slovak Spectator:
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I think the word “national” should be heard louder in European politics. I want to
work for my nation. I am also a part of Europe and the European Union, but only
as long as no one interferes with my national rights.66
This rhetoric, which exemplifies much of the program of the SNS, is in opposition to the
European Union’s political vision which demands the sacrifice of a level of national
autonomy to European level governance.
On the whole, then, it seems unclear whether Smer and its coalition truly support
the supranationality of the European Union. Some members of the coalition actually
seem to directly oppose it. In this way, Slovak government behavior seems not to
conform to the political vision of the EU as relates to the further development of
European integration, despite rhetoric to the contrary.
Democracy
At the most basic level, Slovak democracy is functioning. The coalition was
democratically elected, and seems to truly reflect the wishes of the Slovak people. There
have, however, been some disturbing early signs in terms of the government’s
commitment to democracy and the openness and freedom of the government. The
government announced recently that cabinet sessions would be closed to the public. This
was seen by many as an attempt to limit public access to information, and as seriously
decreasing the transparency of the government. There have also been other failed
attempts to limit access to information about government proceedings for the public.
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These measures failed largely in response to significant criticism by the international
community and NGOs in Slovakia.67
Additionally, the government has had tense relationships with the media from the
very first day after the election, when according to the Slovak Spectator, “the victorious
Smer party barred journalists from its headquarters and forced them to wait outside on the
sidewalk” (Slovak Spectator). Since the election, the government has further antagonized
journalists with its policies, and has been accused of trying to direct the media’s coverage
of important government events. Although there has not been any direct attack on the
freedom of the press, the government’s policies do not seem to promote the media
freedom and access that would seem to be embodied by the EU’s concept of strong, free
democratic societies.68
Finally, the government has come under fire for appointing the children of
prominent businessmen, party officials, and donors to high ranking positions within the
government.69 Although the government has argued that all of their nominees are
qualified, widespread accusations of corruption still abound. These accusations were not
lessened when, recently, the economic minister made a statement supporting the use of
dirty money by the government in order to secure arms deals in competition with private
companies.
Overall, there have been a number of signs that the government’s commitment to
truly free and democratic institutions is questionable. While the government backs up its
decisions, the high level of questionable behavior indicates some underlying corruption.
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Finally, attempts to limit access by the media to government actions make these
behaviors increasingly suspect.
Human and Minority Rights
After the formation of the coalition, one of the most immediate concerns
expressed by the international community was over the situation of minority rights.
There was concern that the inclusion of the ultra-nationalist SNS, which had a history of
extreme anti-minority rhetoric, combined with Robert Fico’s own history of less extreme
rhetoric would lead to the worsening of inter-ethnic relations. While Fico’s political party
program was primarily focused on economics, one clause specifically guarantees equal
attention to all regardless of nationality or ethnicity70, but his choice of coalition partners
immediately called this into question.
These fears seemed to be confirmed when immediately following the election and
the formation of the coalition there was a small rash of violent incidents against
Hungarian minorities in Southern Slovakia. More disturbing than the events themselves,
however, was the response of the government. In one incident, a young Hungarian
student claimed to have been attacked in a small town in southern Slovakia. The
government did not quickly condemn the attack, and in fact went on to blame Hungarians
themselves for the situation. Robert Fico called the claims an “attempt to damage
Slovakia’s image”71, and the girl herself reported that “six policemen were shouting at
[her] that [she] was a liar and that [she] had been lying from the beginning”72 Relations
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with Hungary became significantly more tense in the immediate aftermath of the events,
until eventually calming due to bi-lateral negotiations between the two governments.
Despite the official calming of tensions, these events helped cement the
Hungarian minority political party’s (SMK) skepticism of the new coalition. This was
not improved by the government’s continued action towards minorities. There was some
early talk among government officials of repealing the minority language law, which was
one of the central requirements for Slovak accession to the EU. This talk seems largely
to have stopped, however some of the official appointments made by the government
have continued to call into question the level at which they show respect for minority
rights and the concerns of minority groups.
The most high profile example of this is the appointment of Ivan Petransky to lead
the Institute of National Memory. The Institute of National Memory is “an archive that
documents and publishes state crimes committed under Slovakia’s 20th century fascist
and communist regimes”73 The director of the institute is responsible for handling and
disseminating all of the information regarding the history, especially related to the secret
police, from these periods. Petransky’s appointment was considered questionable because
his previous job was as a historian for the ultra-nationalist historical and cultural society,
Matica Slovenska. Matica Slovenska openly glorifies the war-time fascist state and is
well known for its paranoid anti-minority rhetoric. According to the Slovak Spectator
“Matica Slovenská publications do not conceal an approval of the Slovak wartime state
and its president, Jozef Tiso, and even cast doubt on the historical event of the
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Holocaust.”74 Given his past association, many saw this appointment as demonstrating a
clear conflict, and accused Petransky as being unfit for the position. His appointment
was initially not approved after he was seen attending a rally in celebration of the wartime fascist state. Despite these criticisms, however, the government pushed through his
appointment to the post. Many historians have expressed concern that he will not
appropriately deal with the information regarding the fascist past in Slovakia. The
government’s continued support of Petransky, seems to indicate a lack of interest in these
criticisms.75
Fico’s foreign policy has also been seen as a troubling sign of the government’s
dubious relationship to human and minority rights. Fico’s visit to the Cuban embassy,
discussed in the previous section, was largely interpreted as tacit support for the
widespread human rights violations which occur in that country. One representative from
a human rights NGO in Slovakia argued that Fico’s attendance at this event represented a
celebration by Fico of a regime that “for 48 years has been putting free-thinking people in
jail and keeping the rest isolated on the island without giving them the change to freely
choose their political representation.”76 Such concerns were hardly allayed when the
Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, Dusan Caplovic, defended Fico’s presence at
the event, further asserting that Fidel Castro was not a dictator and seeming to downplay
the human rights abuses occurring in that country.77
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Thus, while the government as a whole does not have an officially anti-minority
orientation, its behavior calls into question its dedication to the full protection of the
minority communities in Slovakia. Additionally, some of its appointees, as well as the
leaders of some of the parties in government, express an openly disdainful attitude
towards minorities and exhibit strong nationalist tendencies. Finally, Fico’s behavior
towards Cuba, and the statements of some of his ministers have seemed to express a
contradiction between commonly held European conceptions of human rights and the
understanding of these rights in the Slovak government.
Social Responsibility
It is in the area of social responsibility that Smer’s rhetoric seems most clearly to
conform to the ideas of the European Union. As a socialist party, many of the theories
underlying Smer’s political program are based on greater social welfare and protection.
Unfortunately, the paths that he has taken in these areas do not conform as well in
practice as in theory to the European social model. His focus here has been taxation and
monetary policy. Despite the fact that his economic ideas may be somewhat more leftist,
they do not seem to create a clear improvement in the economic and social conditions of
the country. Additionally, many of the policies which Fico would like to see overturned,
such as tax and financial policy, represent some of the most successful policies of the last
government and are viewed quite favorably in the international community. Finally,
because Fico’s vision of social responsibility does not seem, in practice, to extend to
minorities (as discussed above), it is difficult to take his claims of improving the
conditions of all those in Slovakia seriously.
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Chapter 8
Slovak Public Opinion and the European Union
The final level of analysis at which I will examine Slovakia’s political culture in
relation to the political vision of the European Union is through public opinion. Using
both domestic public opinion polls, and data from the 2006 Eurobarometer, I will look at
Slovak support for the government as well as the EU. Additionally, I will explore Slovak
opinion of these bodies, the way they should function, and the impact that they have on
their lives as citizens.
Government vs. EU Support
As I have discussed in previous sections, in the June elections, Smer received just
under 30% of the vote. The other two coalition partners, the HZDS and the SNS,
received 8.79% and 11.73% of the vote respectively.78 Given some of the contentious
decisions made by the government in recent months (discussed in previous chapters), it is
interesting to see how stable the government’s support has been since its election.
A recent public opinion poll conducted by the Statistics Office’s Institute for
Public Opinion Research (UVVM) in February 200779 shows that not only is Smer still
the most popular party in the country, but its support has actually increased significantly
since the party took office. According to this survey, 46.7% of respondents support
Smer, a truly incredible number in Slovakia’s multi-party system. Additionally, the SNS,
while having lost some support since the election (down to 10.6% from 11.73% of votes
in the election), is now the second most popular party in the country due to plummeting
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levels of support for the former government party of the SDKU. The HZDS has also
done well, with its support rising to 10.4%. The combined support for the three parties in
the government is 67.7%
This high level of support is particularly interesting in light of the government’s
criticism by the international community in a number of areas. Smer’s support, of
course, is the most astounding. An opinion in the Slovak Spectator recently speculated
that in the next round of elections, Fico’s Smer would have the ability to rule as a single
party, without a coalition80. While this may still be some ways off, it is clear that Smer
holds significant power among the Slovak public, and that the coalition in general enjoys
extremely high levels of support.
The European Union also continues to enjoy extremely high levels of public
support in Slovakia. In the recent Eurobarometer survey81, conducted in the fall of 2006,
after the parliamentary elections, 61% of Slovaks considered EU membership a good
thing. An even higher percentage, 71%, believed that the country had benefited from EU
membership. These numbers are interesting in relation to one another, because the
government seems to garner similarly high levels of support to those of the European
Union, despite the fact that as I have discussed in previous sections, their values do not
always seem to align.
A similar contradiction seems to arise over questions of trust. Slovaks, as they
have done in the past, trust the European Union significantly more than they trust their
own national government. Only 39% of Slovaks trust the Slovak government (although
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Fico’s individual numbers are higher at 45.6%) while 62% trust the European Union. On
the other hand, government trust has increased by 18% since the election of the new
coalition. These numbers seem likely to continue to increase given the high levels of
government support throughout Slovakia. Concurrently, trust for the European Union
has also increased. Thus, while Slovaks have generally tended to trust EU institutions
more readily than national institutions, and continue to do so, it is interesting to observe
that both of these numbers have gone up, despite government behavior. The government,
which seems to act in opposition to many core EU values, is more trusted than the
previous government which was widely viewed in a positive light by the EU.
Additionally, trust in such a government has not had any negative impact on growing
trust in EU institutions.
European Integration and Stronger European Political Union
One of the questions asked on the most recent Eurobarometer related to support or
lack of support for “the development of European integration towards European political
union”. At the most basic level, this question is key in evaluating EU citizen support for
increased supranationality in the European Union, and thus speaks to one of the core
political values of the EU. Answers to this question would seem to be a marker of
whether or not individuals support this concept.
Slovaks, along with Slovenes, came out as the most supportive of the 25 states
surveyed of such developments. 77% of Slovaks supported the above quote, and
therefore, at least in theory, the principle of supranational governance and an expanded
European influence on political community. Interestingly, however, the Eurobarometer
goes on to observe that while Slovaks support the concept of greater European political
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unity, their views on what this entails “do not correspond with the probable competencies
of European political union”. In other words, Slovak definitions of a political union do
not correspond with EU hopes for such a union.
In discussing the areas where the EU should have influence over Slovak policy,
58% of Slovaks believe that agriculture should be the sole responsibility of the national
government, while even more, 80%, believe that the EU should not play a role in the
development of taxation policy. Ironically, the European Union already has an
extraordinarily high degree of control over the development of agricultural policies
through the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). While the EU does not directly control
tax policy, it does influence economic policy, and many of the tax policies passed by the
previous government were related to European demands of economic integration. Thus,
the areas where Slovaks believe the EU should have the least influence actually represent
areas where the EU has a relatively significant influence.
On the other hand, Slovaks are generally quite comfortable with a large degree of
EU influence on foreign and security policy. These are policy areas towards which the
EU leaders might like to expand, but where it has little concrete control at the present
time. In general, it is in the realm of domestic policies such as agriculture, food
production, human and minority rights, and monetary issues where the EU has the most
significant influence. At this time, European states have been generally reluctant to
sacrifice national sovereignty on foreign and security issues.
Thus, European political community actually functions in direct opposition to
Slovak concepts of how this community should be structured. The policies which
Slovaks feel least inclined to sacrifice to supranational governance are the policies over
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which the EU has the most concrete control, and those policies where Slovaks are more
willing to give up their national sovereignty are areas where the EU has, and is likely to
continue at least for a few years to have, relatively little control. This points to a
contradiction between EU and Slovak concepts of increased political union, which make
the interpretation of strong Slovak support for such a union extremely complicated.
Slovak Vision of the European Union
Finally, in evaluating public opinion in Slovakia, it is important to look at how
Slovaks view and define the European Union. I have already established that Slovaks
show strong support for the European Union in general, and for the concepts of further
political integration within the Union. On the other hand, there have seemed to be some
contradictions in Slovak and EU interpretations of these concepts. How, then, do Slovaks
perceive the European Union as an institutional body?
When asked to describe the values that most represent the European Union, the
most common answer among Slovaks was democracy, which 50% of Slovaks identified
as the principle which most defined the European Union. After democracy were peace
and human rights, each of which were chosen by 43% of respondents. Additionally, 72%
of Slovaks believe that the values of European states are “fairly close” or “very close” to
one another. In their definition of the European Union, Slovaks are similar to other
European states in choosing issues of democracy, peace and human rights. These
answers also seem to conform to the EU’s own political project and core values.
Somewhat contradictory, however, are Slovaks’ perceptions of their role within
this institution. Despite rating democracy as the most central value of the European
Union, 62% of Slovaks “do not think their voice counts in the European Union”, and only
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10% of Slovaks feel that they are “involved with the European Union”. Also, while
Slovaks rate human rights as a strong value of the European Union, there was significant
outcry among both the public and several political parties against passing minority
protection legislation as mandated by the European Union during the accession process.82
Thus, Slovaks believe that democracy defines the European Union as an
institution, but do not feel that they, as citizens within this democracy, have a voice.
They believe that human rights are central to the European Union, and that European
values tend to be consistent across states, but do not support the sorts of legislation that
the EU deems necessary for the protection of these rights which are so central. These
contradictions seem to point to a complexity of interaction between the European Union
and Slovakia which will be analyzed in more depth in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between Slovak visions of their own
place in Europe and their domestic political community, of Europe’s political future, and
of the European Union’s own political vision and expectations. Using public opinion
data, voting patterns and government policy and behavior I have examined the Slovak
political orientation both domestically and in relation to the EU. I have offered a broad
focus which includes both individual’s and the government’s perspectives, and to
examine not only individual factors, but the interaction of a variety of variables. Through
this exploration, I have attempted to answer the question of whether Slovakia conforms to
the European Union’s core political vision.
My exploration suggests that there is not a clear yes or no answer to this question.
Slovakia’s relationship with the political goals of the European Union seems to be
complicated and contradictory. At times, Slovaks seem to embody the ideal European
citizens, with high levels of support for the European Union and for further integration of
the European community. On the other hand, there seems to be relatively low levels of
support for the sorts of policies which would back up these positive indicators. Referring
back to my earlier critique of existing scholarship on Europeanization, we can see that it
is precisely these complexities which are largely absent in examinations of
Europeanization and European integration.
In chapter two, I argued that the existing literature tends to neglect the bidirectional nature of Europeanization. While Borzel has addressed this to some extent in
her scholarship, I believe that her primary focus on institutional development excludes an
important aspect of these processes: the interaction between not only EU institutions and
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domestic institutions, but between the underlying understandings of political culture in
the European Union and individual states. I argued that in examining and evaluating
processes of Europeanization, it is important to look both at shifts in policy and at
changes which happen at the level of political culture, and simultaneously examine not
only how the EU interacts with member states, but also how member states respond to the
EU. The contradictions inherent in the Slovak case point to the fact that to ignore these
issues is to ignore some of the more serious, underlying challenges of Europeanization.
An examination of the Slovak case from a purely institutional perspective would
likely result in a rather positive conclusion about Slovakia’s progress towards
Europeanization. A deeper look at the functioning of these institutions might be slightly
less optimistic, but would tend to also indicate strong progress. Slovakia has made legal
reforms and shifted many of its policies to conform to the norms required by the
European Union, and at least rhetorically, the government perceives itself as moving
towards Europe.
Concurrently, examining the Slovak case from the perspective of only cultural
and social developments, as measured primarily by opinion polls, would also likely lead
to a positive conclusion. Public support for Slovakia’s continued integration into the
European Union is high, and Slovaks have high levels of trust and support for the EU.
Slovaks rank higher than almost any other state in the Union in all of these areas.
As I have examined in this paper, however, these findings do not tell the whole
story. Thus, an examination of the process of Europeanization in Slovakia which takes
into account only one side of the process is likely to have somewhat superficial results. It
is only when we dig deeper, and begin to examine the interactions between the varying
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aspects of this process that we find the contradictions which I have explored in this thesis.
These contradictions only become evident in the interplay between EU and domestic
political cultures, and in the relationships between citizens and governments, which tend
not to be concretely addressed in literature on Europeanization.
It is in these interactions that we can observe that although Slovaks have high
levels of support for the European Union, their voting behaviors and their understanding
of the European Union make the meaning behind this support difficult to gauge.
Although Slovaks support greater European integration, they also do not believe that this
should infringe on control over domestic issues, which contradicts the European Union’s
own goals of greater supranational governance. Slovaks believe that the European Union
represents their values, but do not believe that they have a say in the organization which
dictates how those values will be represented. All of this points to an underlying conflict
which is not clear through an examination based on individual factors alone.
It is in these contradictions between the domestic political culture of Slovakia and
the European Union’s political ideals that we see the impact of nationalism on
Europeanization in the Slovak case. There is still a strong undercurrent of nationalist
sentiment among both individuals and the government in Slovakia. In relation to
Europeanization, nationalism is likely to always present a conflict. From the earliest days
of the European Coal and Steel Community, it was nationalism which was European
unity’s greatest foe. It is difficult to conceive of a state which can be simultaneously
committed to nationalism and supranationalism. The terms seem to contradict one
another, and yet this seems to underlie Slovakia’s current political situation.
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Slovakia has a government which contains parties with a strong history of
nationalist sentiment. Current sentiment is less extreme, but has tended to be
increasingly nationalist in recent years, and yet as this nationalist rhetoric increases, so
does Slovakia’s claims to and support for European integration. This conflict between a
domestic political culture which still has strong nationalist undertones and an EU political
culture dedicated to eliminating such sentiments may also help to explain many of the
contradictions in public opinion, for example high support for the European Union
combined with an aversion to EU intervention in domestic affairs, or pro-EU rhetoric by
government parties combined with simultaneous assertions of political independence
through policy.

The EU is viewed positively, but conflicting concepts of political

culture mean that implementation of policies is challenging, and the political parties
which Slovaks support may not be the most pro-EU. Eventually, this conflict will have
to be negotiated. In the long run, Slovakia and the EU are dealing with a contradiction of
values at a deep level, and if Europeanization is going to continue, this contradiction will
have to be resolved.
Europeanization, however, progresses without attention to the intricacies and
contradictions present in individual states. Instead, EU accession, meant to be the
institutional embodiment of this process, is applied as a cookie cutter formula to all
states, with the expectations that all states will comply in identical ways. By ignoring
individual situations, the EU has created long term challenges for itself in the attempt to
develop a strongly united European community.
I predict that the long-term impacts of these contradictions will have serious
implications for the EU’s goal of European unification. If the political goals of states
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continue to conflict, at a basic level, with the political goals of the European Union,
support for the EU both among citizens and among governments is likely to falter. This
is likely to mean a lack of political will and societal support for the continued integration
of states into the European community, and for the expansion of supranational
governance in Europe.
These explorations, however, still leave open the question of why these
contradictions and challenges exist. I touched on this briefly in the preceding paragraphs,
but they warrant greater theorizing. Based on my research, I believe that there are
multiple influences which have shaped the Slovak case. Some of these are specific to the
Slovakia in particular, but others seem to point to a larger European trend and to
underlying challenges in the European Union and processes of Europeanization.
Slovak history, as explored in Chapter 3, is marked by almost contiguous
domination by outside forces. In the context of both empires and federal states, Slovak
national identity has been challenged and threatened for as long as it has existed.
Nationalist sentiment, in both the positive and negative sense, developed among Slovaks
as a reaction to such threats. Historically, when Slovaks have felt that their identity was
threatened, nationalist sentiment, particularly outspoken and violent nationalist sentiment,
has tended to rise in response to an insecurity of identity, and a desire to protect
individual national identity. One example of this is the rise of fascism partially in
response to the sense of domination by the Czech majority in Czechoslovakia. This is
perhaps the most extreme case, but there are other examples of the relationship between
domination or autonomy and nationalism, such as the rise of nationalism in response to
Magyarization, and decreases in nationalism under communism after the Czechoslovak
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state was federalized and Slovakia granted significant autonomy within the state. These
examples show a link between a sense of threat to the Slovak identity and the rise of
nationalist and oppositional sentiment within Slovakia.
We can see a similar situation now in response to the European Union. The
current Slovak state is the first fully independent, autonomous state in Slovak history. It
is the first time that Slovaks have been fully in control of their own affairs, but the EU
has limited that. Immediately after independence, Slovakia moved to join the EU and
thus has once again placed its sovereignty partially in the hands of another entity. While
the EU may not be a dominating force in the same way as, for example, Austria-Hungary,
it represents the transfer of control over Slovak affairs away from Slovaks and towards a
supranational entity. This actual transfer, combined with a cultural memory of much
stronger domination, then invokes a rise in nationalist sentiment in order to more strongly
assert the Slovak identity.
Partially, this is due to the interactions between Slovakia and the European Union
in the process of accession, and in the implementation of policies since membership. In
discussing theories of nationalism early in the paper, I outlined three major approaches to
the study. I myself defined nationalism using an ethnosymbolist approach, but it is
interesting to look at the modernist and primordialist approaches in examining Slovak
interactions with the EU.
Slovak nationalism has typically taken a primordialist approach to understanding
the nation. That is, Slovak national consciousness is described as being deeply linked to
a historical and almost spiritual connection to “Slovakness”. In contrast, the European
Union takes a much more modernist approach to understanding national identity. That is,
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the EU treats national identity as something which can be shaped, and changed over time,
and uses integration and accession to attempt to create new identities for its citizens. The
EU, then, assumes that individuals within states will respond to this project in rational
ways and with modernist concepts of their own identities. In Slovakia, however, because
national identity is grounded in rhetoric of primordial, historical attachment, this
modernist project of constructing new identities, and of identifying oneself strongly with
a supranational identity, becomes an attack on the foundations of national identity. The
EU and Slovakia are approaching the idea of identity in concretely different ways, and
this leads to a lack of fit between the EU’s approach and the Slovak approach. In a sense,
the two groups are speaking different languages of the nation, and this is a major factor in
creating opposing political cultures which subsequently create challenges to
Europeanization.
Although these proceses do seem to be linked to the particularities of Slovak
history, if we look more broadly at Europe in general, many of the contradictions and
problems which I have examined in the Slovak case seem not to be isolated, but to fit into
a larger trend. Throughout Europe from France to Finland, not to mention in the rest of
Central and Eastern Europe, there is growing support for nationalist policies and growing
opposition to the further expansion of EU control. We can see these trends in the
German parliamentary elections of 2006 where in several regional parliaments neo-Nazi
parties gained seats, in the current French elections, and, of course, in the failure of the
EU constitution which was perceived by many as an attempt to bring greater
federalization to the European system.
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It would seem that the contradictions which I have explored in this thesis,
although influenced by Slovakia’s own history and current situation, run deeper than
simply the particularities of individual, national cases, and instead can be seen throughout
the EU. Negative reactions to greater supranationalism have become a European trend. I
theorize that given this wider trend, many of the challenges we see in Slovakia actually
rest in the process of Europeanization and the project of EU expansion itself. As these
processes continue, national sovereignty is increasingly eroded, and this makes states and
their citizens increasingly insecure. The response has been stronger support for
nationalism and Euroskeptic policies. These policies are appealing in response to the EU
because they address the underlying fear of loss of identitiy which grows as the
independence of states is gradually lost. It make sense that the earliest signs of such
trends are most apparent in young states which are already insecure, like Slovakia, but
they are increasingly evident in strong, established democracies as well.
These conflicts, if left unchecked, will have serious long-term consequences for
the European Union. Indeed, it seems possible that such conflicts could spell its end.
The sort of supranational governance that the EU would like to promote requires strong
support from both individual states and from individuals in order to succeed. There must
be strong political will backing sacrifices in national sovereignty, or such sacrifices will
not be accepted. Citizens must view the positive impacts of such policies as outweighing
the loss they cause in order to find them appealing, and the current situation would seem
to indicate that support for such views is not clear. Perhaps the European Union has
simply reached the boundaries of supranationality in Europe and can go no further, either
physically or politically.
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If the EU continues to try to extend its reach in spite of the growing negative
impacts of such policies, it is likely that these early signs of national backlash will grow
into much more serious opposition, and that this opposition will continue to spread. It is
perhaps time for the European Union to reevaluate its goals and reconsider the final
outcome that it would like to achieve. It is certain that the EU’s current project still has a
long way to go. If the EU wants to continue on its current path, it will need to try to
resolve the contradictions present in the Slovak case, and increasingly in other European
states as well. Whether or not these contradictions are resolvable or simply represent the
final borders of Supranationalism today is something which will only become clear in the
years to come.
The European Union’s future success or failure seems to me to depend on its
ability to find a balance between EU and member state goals, and between supranational
control and national sovereignty. It may be that stronger supranational governance is not
reasonable for Europe today, but the EU still has the opportunity to be an organization
which creates greater security and stronger democracies through the cooperation of states.
The future of the EU as an institution, of the values that it embodies, and of the structure
of the European community is dependent upon the negotiation of the complex and often
contradictory relationships between member states and the European Union.
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